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Does decentralisation make a difference?  Comparing the democratic performance 
of central and regional governing systems in the United Kingdom 
 
Abstract 
  
 
Decentralisation is frequently justified in terms of representation and participation, its advocates 
emphasising the capacity of regional institutions to remedy the democratic deficiencies of the centre.  
Yet empirical examinations of the democratic performance of regional governing systems are scarce; 
and there is no analysis that systematically compares the operation of different tiers within the same 
state.  This article responds to this significant lacuna.  Drawing upon the tools of cross-national 
comparison, it develops an analytical framework that evaluates the effects of regional and national 
institutions on the dispersal of electoral payoffs.  This is applied to the United Kingdom, to compare 
the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales with Westminster.  Through this analysis, 
the article provides important empirical insights regarding the difference wrought by decentralisation; 
and in turn, contributes to a burgeoning body of literature that offers a more critical assessment of 
the relationship between decentralisation and such democratic goods. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
proportionality, representation, office payoffs and policy payoffs, devolution and regionalism, 
United Kingdom 
 
Funding 
 
This work was supported by the British Academy under Grant Number SG131355 
 
 
***** 
 
 
ZĞĐĞŶƚĚĞĐĂĚĞƐŚĂǀĞǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚĂ ‘ŐůŽďĂůƚƌĞŶĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2003) as 
national governments throughout the world have transferred key competencies to their regional 
counterparts.  A myriad of factors has driven this unprecedented dispersal of powers, including the 
growing significance of regional parties (Brancati, 2008; Toubeau, 2011) and the effects of European 
integration (Bache, 2007). Decentralisation is frequently accompanied by a narrative highlighting its 
participatory benefits (see Barber, 2013; Sorens, 2009); and several scholars have argued that a 
positive relationship exists between decentralisation and the realisation of democratic goods (for 
example Diamond, 1999; Hooghe et al., 2010; Lijphart, 2012).  There is, however, no a priori reason 
to assume that decentralisation will foster a closer connection between voters and legislators; and 
the extent to which regional governing systems are more ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞƚŽĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ 
remains a matter for empirical investigation.  Yet, in contrast to the considerable attention devoted 
to national  ‘ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? (notably Lijphart, 2012), analyses of the institutional inputs of 
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regional systems of government are scarce.  Indeed, despite the fact that decentralisation is often 
justified in terms of addressing the perceived deficiencies of central government, there exists no 
comparative analyses of different tiers of government within the same state.  This matters as 
dĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ  ‘Ŷot simply a phenomenon haviŶŐ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ ǀŝƌƚƵĞƐ ?  ?Ğ sƌŝĞƐ, 2000: 195), and 
promises that regional governance will revitalise democracy risk raising expectations that may not be 
fulfilled.   
 
This article directly addresses this lacuna, and draws upon Powell ?ƐElections as Instruments of 
Democracy (2000) to develop an analytical framework that compares regional and national 
government in terms of the dispersal of electoral payoffs.  In particular, and iŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ƚŽ  ‘ƐƚĂƚŝĐ
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚůŽŽŬĂƚ ‘ǀŽƚĞĂŶĚƐĞĂƚƐĂůŽŶĞ ? ?ůĂƵ ? ? ? ? ? P168), this framework distinguishes between 
office payoffs and policy payoffs to examine the institutional opportunities that exist for both 
executive and non-executive legislators to affect the policy process.  This framework is applied to the 
United Kingdom (UK) to compare the Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales (NAW) and 
Westminster.  The case of the UK merits scholarly attention, and offers an important opportunity to 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ  ‘ǀĂƌǇŝŶŐ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ  ‘context and rules [of] an existing 
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? (Bohrer and Krutz, 2005: 654-5). The transfer of governing competencies via the Scotland 
Act 1998 and the Government of Wales Act 1998 constituted an important watershed in ƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
majoritarian tradition, and was explicitly justified by the then Labour Government in terms of 
addressing the democratic deficits of Westminster majoritarianism (e.g. Cm. 3658, 1997; Cm. 3718, 
1997).  ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ŶĞǁ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?devolution was forged in the shadow of 
Westminster; and the existence of different modes of democracy across the UK has instead resulted 
in uneasy asymmetry and  ‘ďŝ-constitutionality ? (Flinders, 2005; Matthews and Flinders, 2017), the 
implications of which continue to unfold. 
 
 
Through its analysis, this article makes a number of important contributions.  Empirically, it provides 
critical insights regarding the difference wrought by regional government in terms of representation 
and the dispersal of electoral spoils; and by broadly controlling for factors such as political culture and 
governing norms, the single-country research design captures the effects of institutional variables 
such as electoral rules and committee systems (see Snyder, 2001). Theoretically, it contributes to a 
burgeoning body of literature that promotes a more nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between decentralisation and democratic goods (for example De Vries, 2000; Fatke, 2016; Spina, 
2004); and dovetails with an important strand of work that examines whether institutional structures 
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ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĚĞůŝǀĞƌ ĂŶ ŽƉƚŝŵƵŵ  ‘ƐǁĞĞƚ-ƐƉŽƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ
(Carey and Hix, 2011; see also Kaiser et al, 2002; Aarts and Thomassen, 2008).  Methodologically, it 
develops an analytical framework that can be applied to different sites of government simultaneously, 
moving ďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?(Jeffery, 2008; Jeffery and Wincott, 2010) that has 
hitherto predominated.  To develop these strands, the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, 
it elaborates briefly on the relationship between decentralisation, representation and institutional 
design; and discusses the necessity of establishing these connections through inter-region and intra-
state analysis.  Following on from this, the analytical framework is established.  The framework is then 
applied to the UK, and the empirical results presented and evaluated.  The article concludes by locating 
these findings within a series of theoretical debates regarding the relationship between political 
preferences and party competition; and methodological debates regarding the value of a  ‘ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůǇ 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?^nyder, 2001: 100).   
 
 
Decentralisation, representation and institutional design 
 
In their seminal work, The Rise of Regional Authority, Hooghe et al. praise regional democracy for 
having  ‘ƚŚĞĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůǀŝƌƚƵĞŽĨ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐŝƚŝzens and 
ƌƵůĞƌƐ ?  ?2010: 62); and in doing so echoed earlier scholars such as Dahl and Tufte, who stated that 
 ‘ǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůůƵŶŝƚƐ ?provide a place where ordinary people can acquiƌĞƚŚĞƐĞŶƐĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ?
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? Such arguments are of a long tradition of political thought, 
encompassing Aristotle, de Tocqueville and Mill, which advocates the participatory virtues of small-
scale, decentralised democratic institutions (see De Vries, 2000).  Yet the extent to which 
ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĚĞůŝǀĞƌƐƚŚĞƐĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŐŽŽĚƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ ‘ĂŶŽƉĞŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?&ĂƚŬĞ, 2016: 668), and 
in recent years several studies have offered a more nuanced assessment.  Spina, for example, 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐ ? ŽĨ ĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƵƉŽŶ ůĞǀĞůƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ĂƌĞ
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ? ?2014: 449-454); and Fatke (2016) reveals that demographic factors remain the most 
important predictors of participation within regions.  Other studies have considered the effect of 
decentralisation on party competition, in particular between regional and state-wide parties.  
Brancati, for example, argues that decentralisation has a  ‘ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ?ŽŶ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ŝn 
terms of electoral strength and opportunities to participate in regional government (2008: 158); and 
ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞĂƚƚŚŝƐůĞǀĞůĐĂƌƌŝĞƐŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?: 136).  In contrast, Bäck et al 
suggest ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůĞǀĞůŝƐƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨƉĂƌƚǇ
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐƉŚĞƌĞ ? ?2013: 368, 382).  Flowing out of this, several scholars focus on 
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the political incentives that drive decentralisation.  Toubeau and Massetti, for example, highlight the 
 ‘ďůĂĐŬŵĂŝů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů exercised by regional parties ƚŽ ‘persuad[e] state-wide parties to 
change electoral strategies ĂŶĚƚŽƐŚŝĨƚƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƉŽůŝĐǇ ?(2013: 304).   In contrast, Sorens addresses 
ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ďǇĚƌĂǁŝŶŐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘regional-government-office-seeking ?
benefits which encourage central government to  ‘offer autonomy to peripheral regions with 
secessionist movements ? ?2009: 269).  
 
 
Together, this scholarship tempers normative arguments advanced in support of decentralisation by 
drawing attention to the way that the behavior of voters and political actors is mediated by 
institutional structures.  Indeed, as De Vries demonstrates, claims to  ‘ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ?
 ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ? ŚĂǀĞ  ‘ďĞĞŶ ŵĂĚĞ ŝŶ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ŽĨ
decentralization and ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ? ? Yet, whilst several studies have 
measured scope and depth of decentralisation (notably Hooghe et al., 2010), there have been few 
systematic analyses of the extent to which the institutional rules and structures of regional systems 
of government affect their representative capacity.  There are some notable exceptions.  Vatter 
(2007), for example, compares the institutions of ^ǁŝƚǌĞƌůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ 26 cantons to reveal a positive 
relationship between opportunities for direct citizen involvement and broadly supported governing 
coalitions; and with Stadelmann-Steffen (2013) compares the 52 sub-national political systems of 
Switzerland, Austria and Germany to reveal the existence of largely consistent country clusters.  
Nonetheless, the overall dearth of sub-national scholarship is  ‘ĂƐƚŽŶŝƐŚŝŶŐ ?(Vatter, 2007: 148), not 
least because  ‘ ?Ě ?ŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚŝŶŐ ĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ĂůŽŶŐ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂů ůŝŶĞƐ ? makes it easier to construct 
ĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐ ? ?^ŶǇĚĞƌ, 2001: 94-5). Indeed, despite the iterative nature of the relationship 
between central and regional government, there are no analyses that directly compares different tiers 
of government within the same state.  This constitutes a significant lacuna, as normative claims made 
in favour of decentralisation are frequently cast in relational terms, and put significant store on the 
capacity of regional institutions to remedy the democratic deficiencies of the centre. 
 
 
The scarcity of such analysis contrasts sharply with the extensive body of scholarship that compares 
the institutions of national political systems.  These studies provide useful cues to guide inter-region 
and intra-state comparison.  Within this literature, an important distinction is drawn between 
democratic systems predicated upon the principles of strong and accountable government, and those 
that privilege inclusion and consensus.  Lijphart, for example, distinguishes between majoritarian and 
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ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ‘ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚ ?ŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌ
ŝŶ ƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨĂďĂƌĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌǁŝƚŚ  ‘ďƌŽĂĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚďƌŽĂĚ
agreement on the policies that the goveƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŚŽƵůĚƉƵƌƐƵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? P2). Similarly, Powell contrasts 
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶĂŶĚƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P4-17).  Elsewhere, Siaroff compares the 
 ‘ƉŽůĂƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƚǇƉĞƐ ?ŽĨ ‘ĐĂďŝŶĞƚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐǇ-making diffusion with a working 
ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? P445).  Such contrasts are underscored by the different points at which legislative 
majorities are formed.  Majoritarianism casts elections as the decisive stage in rewarding the winning 
party with an outright majority of seats and few barriers to the implementation of its agenda.  The 
consensus or proportional vision, in contrast, focuses on the post-election negotiation of multi-party 
coalitions, and the accommodative bargaining that occurs throughout the legislative process.    
 
 
In broad terms, the categorisation of institutional arrangements according to their correspondence 
with different democratic norms offers a fruitful strategy for inter-region and intra-state analysis.  Yet 
to fully capture the extent that the institutional structures of regional government foster a closer 
connection between voters and legislators than their central counterparts, a number of issues need 
to be addressed.  Firstly, there is a tendency within the comparative literature to focus on the 
distribution of votes, seats and portfolios.  However, this engenders binary distinctions  W winners 
versus losers, government versus opposition, consensus versus majoritarianism  W ǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞ ‘ƚŽŽďůƵŶƚ
to comprehend the emergence of more subtle adjusƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?sĂƚƚĞƌĞƚĂů., 2014: 908).  Secondly, a 
focus on the relationship between votes and seats  ‘ŽŶůǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ indirect information about the 
ĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ ? (Blau, 2008: 170-2) and the influence that different groups of legislators may 
have.  In particular, equating influence with office-holding overlooks the other institutional channels 
through which non-government parliamentarians can achieve policy goals, as 'opposition parties may 
be able to exert deliberative policy influence, particularly through efforts in the legislative aƌĞŶĂ ?
(Strøm, 1990: 38-41).   Thirdly, and flowing out of this, a sole focus on office-holding does not capture 
the extent to which supporters of non-government parties are connected to the policy process via the 
ballot box.  As PŝƚŬŝŶŵĂĚĞĐůĞĂƌ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽǀĞƌĂůůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ
functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people.  It is 
representation if the people (or a constituency) are present in government actŝŽŶ ? ?1967: 222).  Finally, 
and more generally, many of indicators used within cross-national studies do not travel the regional 
level or cannot accommodate central-regional comparison.  &Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? >ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ
national-level patterns of democracy includes a number of institutions that have no regional 
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equivalent (e.g. central banks and state constitutions).  Accordingly, to avoid methodological 
ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŽŽǀĞƌĐŽŵĞ ‘ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?ŝƚŝƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽ ‘ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐthe regional level 
in its own right, rather than [as] a scaled-down version ŽĨŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?:ĞĨĨĞƌǇ, 2008: 545).  It is 
to this task that the next section turns. 
 
 
Beyond office payoffs: opportunities for opposition influence and effective representation 
  
In contrast to the wealth of literature focusing on the congruency between votes and seats, there 
have been few attempts to systematically analyse the opportunities for all representatives to affect 
policymaking.  One important exception is Powell (2000), who focuses on the institutional resources 
available to different groups of legislators to determine the extent to which: a) the supporters of 
government and non-government parties are represented in policymaking; and, b) the dispersal of 
electoral spoils corresponds with ĂƉŽůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐ ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĚĞŵŽĐracy.  Powell develops a critical 
distinction between proportional ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂl 
representation focuses on the dispersal of seats and portfolios, effective representation focuses on 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽn is effectively repreƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?  ?2000: 100).  To 
determine this, Powell develops an index of effective representation, which weights the electoral 
support of a party according to the institutional opportunities that exist for it to influence the policy 
process.  Through this index, it is possible differentiate between eacŚ ƉĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƐŚĂƌĞ ?
(office payoff ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐŚĂƌĞ ? ?policy payoff), providing a more nuanced analysis of the extent 
to which institutional structures affect the distribution of power.   
 
 
To determine the degree of connection, WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ index of effective representation applies a series of 
scores to qualify the legislative strength of a party, as detailed in figure 1 below.  The index assumes 
that the supporters of government parties have a guaranteed connection with policymaking, and 
ĂƉƉůŝĞƐĂƐĐŽƌĞŽĨ ? ? ?ƚŽƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞǀŽƚĞ ?/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?it assumes that the degree of 
connection for the supporters of non-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ƵƉŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ
ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂt exist within the legislature, and weights their support in relation to two 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?  &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚĞǆ ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ  ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌ ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
plenary, and qualifies the support received by non-government parties relative to their relationship 
with the executive.  Any party recognised as officially supporting the government receives a score of 
0.75.  Parties wholly outside government receive the following scores: 0.1  W opposition facing majority 
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government; 0.2  W opposition facing supported minority government; 0.5  W opposition facing minority 
government. Secondly, the index focuses on the opporƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?assigning the following scores: 0.25  W strong committees with chairs equally shared 
amongst all large parties; and, 0.125  W either strong committees chaired by government parties or 
weak committees with shared chairs.  The overall  ‘ƉƌŽďĂďůĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨĂŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚǇ thus 
ranges from 0.1 (facing majority government and the absence of legislative committees) to 0.75 
(facing minority government and the presence of strong legislative committees) (Powell, 2000: 103-
9).  To ensure the validity of these weights, Powell triangulates his schema with several other key 
studies that explore the significance attached to various aspects of legislative influence (e.g. Laver and 
Hunt, 1992; Strøm, 1990).  KŶĐĞƚŚĞĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƐĐŽƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽĞĂĐŚƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƐƐŚĂƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ
vote, the qualified support for all government and non-government parties can be aggregated to 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚŽƚĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?The final stage of Powelů ?Ɛ framework 
evaluates a polity ?Ɛ overall correspondence with the majoritarian and proportional  ‘visions of 
democracy ? (Powell, 2000: 136-42). The majoritarianism vision anticipates that the largest party 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ǁŝŶ  ‘ ? ? ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐproportional vision 
requires a close correlation between popular support and the dispersal of authority (Powell, 2000: 
137).  
 
***Figure 1 here*** 
 
To some extent, WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ƚǁŽ ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚthe majoritarian and consensus  ‘ƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƐ ŽĨ
democraĐǇ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇ>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ?2012).  Yet whereas Lijphart focuses on the underlying norms of 
constitutional design (and, indeed, is animated by a stated preference for consensus), Powell focuses 
on the institutional pathways to achieving such principles. As such, ŚŝƐ ‘ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞ
to institutional engineering ? (Achen et al, 2011: 862; see also Taagpera, 2003: 2).  Indeed, WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ
framework has been utilised by comparative scholars working in a range of national-level contexts (for 
example Costello, et al 2012; Mair and Thomassen, 2010 ? ?ĂŶĚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌĂŝƐĞĚĂƐŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂ ‘ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ
approximation of government and opposition legislative ƉŽǁĞƌ ?  ?ůĂƵ, 2008: 173).  Nonetheless, 
ǁŚŝůƐƚ WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ between office and policy payoffs, 
several indicators do not travel to the regional level.  In common with other comparative studies (for 
example Mattson and Strøm, 1995), Powell associates committee strength ǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ Ă
committee to modify legislation, perhaps even introduce lĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶ ? ?2000: 33). However 
existing scholarship makes clear that legislative scrutiny is just one of several functions of a committee 
system (see Benton and Russell, 2013; Kaiser, 2008); and in the context of decentralisation, where 
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regional governments enjoy varying degrees of self-rule (Elazar, 1991), such a narrow focus risks 
neglecting or misrepresenting the multi-dimensionality of their influence.  Secondly, Powell suggests 
that a strong committee system has  ‘over ten standing committees corresponding to government 
departments ? (2000: 35).  Yet in the context of decentralisation, this threshold is arbitrary, as there is 
significant variation in the number of policy areas for which regional government is responsible (see 
Hooghe et al., 2010); and whilst this variation offers an important insight into the degree of self-rule 
enjoyed by a region, the strength of a committee system lies in the extent to which there is a clear 
ĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Ă ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚĂ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
responsibilities.   
 
 
To overcome these limitations, this article draws on the work of scholars such as Kaiser (2008) and 
Benton and Russell (2013) to replace WŽǁĞůů ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůcategories of  ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?
with the following additive criteria (see figure 1 above).  The first element is simply the presence of 
legislative committees, as even a minimal or weak committee system provides a platform for some 
degree of opposition influence.  Nonetheless, ad hoc or irregular committees will suffer from 
structural limitations, and the second element awards a score for a systematic committee structure 
that corresponds with the functions of the executive.  Attention then turns to committee composition.  
Whilst the distribution of chairs is an important indicator of the balance between government and 
opposition, focusing on chairs alone does not capture the ǁŝĚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨĂĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ
membership. The proportionality of membership matters, so the third element focuses on the 
distribution of chairs and ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚed-ǀĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŝůů
be limited if those on a committee owe their positions to party patronage; and the fourth element 
awards a score for the existence of independent selection procedures.  Finally, the powers of 
legislative committees should be ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ ?ĂƐǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐůĞĂƌƐĞƚŽĨĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ
risk being ineffective.  The fifth element accordingly awards a score for the existence of clearly defined 
and commonly accepted responsibilities.  Each element receives a score of 0.05.  The minimum score 
a committee system can receive is zero (i.e. that the legislature does not have a committee system), 
and the maximum score is 0.25.  This corresponds with the maximum score proposed (and validated) 
by Powell, and therefore preserves the balance between the two aspects of opposition influence. The 
next section puts this into effect. 
 
 
Proportional and effective representation across the United Kingdom  
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In the popular referenda of September 1997, a majority of those voting in Scotland and Wales agreed 
that their region should have a devolved assembly, as proposed by the newly elected Labour 
Government.  In advocating devolution, the 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?s support was frequently couched in terms 
of addressing tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ deficits.  Devolution, the Government declared, would  ‘ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶ
ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚŵĂŬĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŵŽƌĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞŽĨ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚ ?(Cm. 3658 
1997: vii); and would  ‘ůŝďĞƌĂƚĞƚŚĞĞŶĞƌŐǇŽĨƚŚĞtĞůƐŚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƌĞĂůĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ?ǀŝĂ ?ĂŵŽĚĞƌŶ ?
progressive and inclusive deŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŵ ? ? ? ? ?, 1997: 10, 24).  Of course, such rhetoric 
belies a complex web of top-down motivations and bottom-up pressures (see Sorens, 2009; Toubeau, 
2011), ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚƚŚĞ>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ ?Ɛdesire to see  ‘the threat of sepĂƌĂƚŝƐŵƌĞŵŽǀĞĚ ? ?>ĂďŽƵƌWĂƌƚǇ, 
1997).  EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŽďƐĞƌǀĞƌƐŚĂŝůĞĚĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ ‘ĨƵůů-blooded constitutional 
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽƵůĚ  ‘ĚƌĂŐ ? the political system away from an extreme version of majoritarian 
democracy ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă ŵŽƌĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂů ŵŽĚĞů ?  ?DĂŝƌ, 2000: 34).  Yet despite such 
optimism, a question mark hangs over the extent to which the devolved systems of government were 
calibrated to realise such ideals ?  tŚŝůƐƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŚǇďƌŝĚ  ‘ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŵĞŵďĞƌ ? ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂů
systems in both regions did represent a departure from Westminster tradition, devolution was 
enacted within a framework that was designed by the centre and imbued with a number of 
majoritarian assumptions regarding the role of government and the division of legislature-executive 
relationships (Arter, 2004; Cairney and Wildfeldt, 2015; McAllister and Stirbu, 2007; Mitchell, 2000).  
By applying the analytical framework developed above, the remainder of this section will therefore 
systematically ascertain the extent to which the institutional architecture of devolution has promoted 
an alternative  ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? 
 
 
The proportionality of electoral outcomes and the dispersal of office payoffs 
 
A series of measures are applied to gauge the proportionality of election outcomes across the three 
polities (see table 1, online).  In many respects, Westminster ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚƵƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ƚĞŵƉůĂƚĞ ?
(Mitchell, 2000) of adversarial majoritarianism is reinforced. Single-party governments predominate 
despite lacking the support of a majority of voters (the Coalition of 2010-15 being the exception on 
both counts), which suggests ƚŚĂƚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ŝŶŚĂďŝƚƐĂ  ‘ƐƵď-majoritarian sphere of pluralitarian 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? (Nagel, 2000: 118).  The declining vote basis of government is inexorably bound up with the 
changing nature of party competition, which between 1997-2015 had become increasingly multi-party 
in terms of votes cast, despite the (theoretical) disincentives posed bǇtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƌƵůĞƐ.  
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Yet the diffuse support for many smaller parties and the high thresholds imposed by single-member 
districts limited the impact upon the distribution of seats, resulting in a widening gap between the 
effective number of electoral parties and parliamentary parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979), and 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ(1991) further underscores the loosening of this relationship.  
Indeed, the burgeoning gap between votes and seats had weakened the vote basis of Parliament itself, 
and table 1 shows that the rĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ŐĂƉ ?(i.e. the difference between votes cast and the vote 
basis of the legislature) reached a record high of 24.0% in 2015.  It should be noted that the outcome 
of the snap general election of 2017 runs counter to these longer-term trends.  At 82.3%, the share of 
the vote accorded to Labour and the Conservatives was the highest won by the two main parties since 
1970, which increased the vote basis of the government and legislature, whilst the decline of popular 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŽclose the gap between the effective number of electoral and 
parliamentary parties.   Indeed, at 6.46, the Gallagher score for the 2017 Westminster election was 
the lowest since 1970, and amongst the lowest of the all the elections observed in this study.  
Nonetheless, whilst the confidence-and-supply arrangement between the Conservatives and the 
Democratic Unionist Party has afforded the latter greater policy leverage, the Prime Minister 
immediately ruled out a formal power-sharing coalition; and her determination to govern as a 
minority can be regarded as evidence of the enduring influence of the norms of majoritarianism.  
 
 
The transfer of competencies to the Scottish Parliament and NAW in 1999 constituted a critical 
juncture in terms of the scope and depth of self-rule.1  Yet, the extent to which the structures of 
regional government support the democratic ŝĚĞĂůƐŽĨ ‘ŶĞǁƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?(Mitchell, 2000) is less clear.  In 
each region, a multi-party system has developed, with elections being fought along the  ‘centre-
periphery cleavage ?(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), reflecting the relative electoral strength of non-
statewide parties at the regional level (see Brancati, 2008).  Moreover, the additional member system 
has ensured a closer congruence between party competition and the dispersal of seats within each 
legislature, which is further reiterated by the significantly lower scores that each region receives on 
'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?Ɛŝndex of disproportionality.  Nonetheless, a more proportional electoral system has not 
fostered a more collegial approach to the sharing of executive power, and on several occasions, 
plurality-winning parties have demonstrated a clear preference for governing alone.  In Scotland, the 
Labour-Liberal Democrat coalitions of 1999-2003 and 2003- ? ǁĞƌĞ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘the closest thing 
possible in Scotland to majoritarian government in a government-versus-ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ĂƚŵŽƐƉŚĞƌĞ ?
owing to tightly-whipped discipline and voting cohesion (Cairney and Wildfeldt, 2015: 9).  Moreover, 
since 2007 Scottish National Party (SNP) has been the sole party of government; and despite failing to 
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secure a majority of seats in 2007 and 2016, has eschewed formal power sharing arrangements with 
allies such as the Scottish Greens.  In Wales, the Labour Party governed as a minority for the duration 
of the 2003-7 Assembly; and the coalitions formed with the Liberal Democrats (2000 and 2016) and 
Plaid Cymru (2007) have been regarded as pragmatic expedience (Palmer, 2011: 277). Together, this 
suggests that  ‘a Westminster ĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚĨƌĂŵĞŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?ĂŝƌŶĞǇĂŶĚtŝĚĨĞůdt, 2015: 15) has 
limited the effect of increased legislative proportionality on subsequent patterns of government 
formation; and as shown in table 1, the average difference in the effective number of cabinet parties 
across the three domains is negligible. 
 
 Qualifying the conditions for opposition influence 
 
However, to fully capture the extent that institutional structures connect the electorate with the 
policy process, it is also necessary to account for the extent to which each governing system provides 
opportunities for opposition legislators to achieve policy payoffs.  Each polity is scored according to 
two aspects of opposition influence detailed above (see table, 2 online).  In terms of the first aspect, 
bargaining with the government, the domination of tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ House of Commons by majority 
governments had limited the leverage of non-government parties on the floor of the House; and whilst 
the increased rate of parliamentary rebellions has been cited as evidence of the loosening bonds of 
party discipline (e.g. Cowley, 2005), it remains relatively rare for governments to suffer defeats in the 
Commons.    Once again, though, the outcome of the 2017 election is a point of departure.  The loss 
of their parliamentary majority has rendered the minority Conservative Government as highly 
dependent ƵƉŽŶ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ hŶŝŽŶŝƐƚ WĂƌƚǇ ? ǁŚŽƐĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŝŶ ŬĞǇ ǀŽƚĞƐ ǁĂƐ
secured in exchange for an additional £1bn of public expenditure in the Province; and with such a 
slender working majority, the Government is extremely vulnerable to both opposition and backbench 
challenge at a time when the agenda is dominated by ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛwithdrawal from the European Union.   
The current parliament therefore provides the ideal conditions for the House of Commons to shed its 
reputation as a mere  ‘ĨŽƌƵŵ ?(Powell, 2000: 106) or ineĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ĂƌĞŶĂ ? ?WŽůƐďǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
 
 
In contrast, the relative frequency of minority government in Scotland and Wales has created the 
conditions for non-government parties to exert influence over their respective executives.  This is 
illustrated by two incidents.  In Wales, the NAW divided in 2016 as Leanne Wood, leader of Plaid 
Cymru, sought to block Labour leader CarwyŶ:ŽŶĞƐ ?ƌĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚĂƐĨŝƌƐƚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ; and the deadlock 
ended only once Jones conceded to discussions with Plaid Cymru about  ‘ĂƌĞĂƐŽĨĐŽŵŵŽŶŐƌŽund that 
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ǁĞĐĂŶǁŽƌŬŽŶ ? ?:ŽŶĞƐ, 2016).  Whilst Jones stressed that such discussionƐ ‘ǁŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ
ƚĂůŬƐ ?, this does underline the opportunities that minority government provides opposition parties to 
extract policy payoffs.  In Scotland, the SNP minority government of 2007-2011 relied upon the formal 
support of the Scottish Greens, committing to a number of environmental policies in exchange for 
 ‘ǀŽƚĞƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŵŝŶŝƐter and ministerial appointments ?  ?^EW ĂŶĚ ^Đottish Greens, 2007).  In 
addition, throughout the 2007-11 parliament, the SNP relied heavily on the support of the 
Conservatives to pass its four annual budgets, which was given in exchange for concessions on issues 
including business rates and town centre redevelopment.  
 
 
In terms of the second aspect, the scores in table 2 ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ
provides a relatively important vehicle for opposition influence.  A formal system of select committees 
corresponding to ministerial departments was introduced in 1979, and was later praised for  ‘show[ing] 
the House of Commons at its best ?with constructive co-operation rather than routine disagreement ? 
(HC 300, 2000: 5).  Nonetheless, the lack of esteem attached to the task of oversight and the lack of 
clearly defined committee responsibilities was seen to undermine their impact (HC 300, 2000: 6).  In 
response, several reforms relating to the resources enjoyed by select committees have been enacted.  
Recognising the  ‘ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? of ministerial office, the Liaison Committee recommended that 
executive oǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ  ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?, recognised by additional salary for 
chairs (HC 300, 2000: 29; see also HC 224, 2002: 41).  In 2002, Parliament agreed to this additional 
payment.  There remained, however, concerns regarding the independence of appointments; and in 
2009 the Wright Committee proposed the election of chairs by the House, and the election of 
members by secret ballot within each political party (HC 1117, 2009: 80).  The election of chairs was 
agreed to in May 2010, and secret ballots followed in June 2010.  Parliament stopped short in 
implementing proposals pertaining to members, and inƐƚĞĂĚĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚƚŽ ‘ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŽĨ
transparent elections within parties (HC Deb 4 March, 2010: c1095).  Further reforms focused on 
select committeeƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞten  ‘core tasks ? developed by the Liaison Committee 
were adopted by resolution of the House; and in 2012, the Committee revisited these tasks, instigating 
several changes to enhance effectiveness (HC 697 2012).  Together, these reforms have bolstered the 
capacity of select committees, contributing ƚŽ Ă  ‘ŶĞǁ ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĂŶĚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?  ?/ŶƐtitute for 
Government, 2015: 2). Indeed, recent evidence suggests that committees have become increasingly 
ǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽŵŽǀĞďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ƉŽůŝĐĞƉĂƚƌŽů ? ?Matthews and Flinders, 2015; McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1984) mode of execuƚŝǀĞŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ?ƐŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ‘ĨŝƌĞĂůĂƌŵƐ ?ŽŶŝƐƐƵĞƐŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĐŚŝůĚƐĞǆƵĂů
exploitation, phone hacking and tax evasion.   
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The scores awarded to the devolved ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞƐ ?committee systems are lower, reflecting a number 
of institutional constraints.  The Et ?Ɛ committee system was initially inhibited by the terms of 
Government of Wales Act 1998.  This established the NAW as a single body corporate with an 
executive committee exercising only those responsibilities delegated to it by the Assembly.  Subject 
committees mapped onto these functions, and reflecting the fusion of legislative and executive 
responsibilities, the Act required the relevant member of the executive committee to also be a 
member of that subject committee (s. 57.4).  The Act did require the politically-balanced distribution 
of chairs and members, stating that members would be elected by the Assembly and chairs selected 
by a panel (s. 57.5-8), but neither the Act nor the ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?Ɛ standing orders specified the means by 
which elections would be held.  The standing orders also delineated a set of common responsibilities, 
encompassing policy development, legislative scrutiny, financial audit and performance monitoring 
(NAW, 1999: 9.7-8).  Yet the capacity of committees to undertake these functions ǁĂƐ  ‘ĐůĞĂƌůǇ
restricted, reflecting the constraŝŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚ ?(McAllister and Stirbu, 2007: 295).  The 
Government of Wales Act 2006 formally separated the legislature and executive, abolishing the 
requirement for members of the executive to sit on their relevant subject committee.  The Act also 
required committee membership to be approved by an extraordinary majority of the Assembly (s. 29), 
although responsibility for electing chairs was transferred to committees themselves (NAW, 2007: 
10.18).  Yet the Act afforded the Assembly greater flexibility in the creation of committees; and since 
2007 there has been a much looser relationship between the remit of scrutiny committees and the 
responsibilities of individual ministers.  Moreover, the frequent reorganisation of ministerial portfolios 
has resulted in a rapid redrawing of committees, with implications for institutional memory and the 
accrual of expertise (McAllister and Stirbu, 2007: 297-8); and the standing orders of the 2007 NAW 
were silent on the specific tasks of scrutiny committees.  Subsequent reforms have sought to address 
these limitations.  In 2011, specific committee tasks were re-introduced with an explicit focus on 
scrutiny (NAW, 2011: para. 16.1); and control over chair appointments was returned to Assembly via 
the Business Committee (NAW, 2011: 17.4).  Furthermore, since 2016 committee chairs have been 
directly elected by the Assembly using secret ballots (NAW, 2016: 17.2-4).   Nonetheless, the relatively 
small size of the NAW has meant that concerns persist regarding committee capacity, with the 
Electoral Reform Society Cymru warning of  ‘an over-mighty Executive with too few AMs to hold it to 
account effectively ?(2013: 13).  
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In contrast, the structures of ƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ committee system have remained constant. 
Compared to the NAW, the Scottish Parliament was subject to less central constraint and the Scotland 
Act 1998 simply required its standing orders to provide for a committee system with politically-
balanced membership.  The WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛstanding orders specify a number of mandatory committees 
and allow Parliament to establish any ƐƵďũĞĐƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝƚƚŚŝŶŬƐĨŝƚ ? ?^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ, 1999: 
6.1).  Yet whilst the standing orders enshrine a series of committee functions (6.2), subject committees 
are not obliged to correspond with ministerial portfolios.  This has led to great variation in the extent 
to which committees map onto the functions of the executive.  Some provide direct scrutiny of a 
specific portfolio, others span two or three, and some are thematic.  In terms of committee 
membership, the standing orders invest authority in the Parliamentary Bureau to determine both the 
general membership ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂůůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŚĂŝƌƐ ?  dŚĞ ƵƌĞĂƵ ŝƐ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞŐĂƌĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
balance of poliƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?(6.3), with similar rules governing chair appointments 
(12.1).  However, whilst Parliament must approve the membership proposed by the Bureau, there are 
few opportunities for parliamentarians to directly influence selection.  Moreover, committee chairs 
are elected by a committee from within its ranks, which means that there is no opportunity for any 
other individual to put themselves forward (12.1). 
 
  
Effective representation and the potential for policy payoffs 
 
Having delineated the institutional opportunities for opposition influence, it is now possible to 
calculate the total conditions for effective representation within each polity,2 and in turn determine 
the extent to which its institutions connect the electorate with policymaking.  Whilst few governments 
have enjoyed majority support, figure 2 reveals that the institutional structures of all three polities 
have provided sufficient opportunities for a majority of voters to be effectively represented.  
Moreover, the average scores span a range of just 5.7, running from 56.4 at Westminster to 62.1 in 
Scotland, which tempers ƚŚĞƐŚĂƌƉĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚĞŶĚƌĂǁŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂů ?tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ ‘ŶĞǁƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŽĨĚĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ.  
 
 
***Figure 2 here*** 
 
Although these averages are broadly similar, significant variation exists in dispersal of opportunities 
for opposition influence.  At Westminster, the most important aspect is the legislative committee 
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structure, which has been critical in providing partial redress to the disproportionality of office payoffs.  
Indeed, the way that governments have responded to demands for reform runs counter to 
 ‘ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ ? (Mattson and Strøm, 1995: 253).  These results therefore challenge existing 
comparative analyses that cast select committees ĂƐ ‘ǁĞĂŬ ? ?WŽǁĞůů, 2000: 106) aŶĚ ‘ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚ ? ?DĂƚƚƐŽŶ
and Strøm, 1995: 260); and in doing so moderates ƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌŝƐ ‘ĂƐƚĂŶĚŽƵƚĐĂƐĞŽĨ
negative rather than constructive ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ŶĚĞǁĞŐ, 2013: 99) in which non-government 
actors are wholly excluded from policymaking.  In Scotland and Wales, the greatest contribution to 
the total conditions for effective representation comes from  ‘opportunities for opposition bargaining ?.  
In both regions, the highest scores achieved are in instances of minority government, which have 
provided the conditions for opposition parliamentarians to exercise what Sartori (1976) famously 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ďůĂĐŬŵĂŝůƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ? This is illustrated by the score of 76.2 assigned to Holyrood in 2016 
following the return of an unsupported SNP minority; and the score of 72.1 assigned to the NAW in 
2011 following the return of an unsupported Labour minority.3  In contrast, one of the lowest scores 
is assigned to the NAW in 2003, when the combination of a (bare) Labour Party majority government 
with a vote basis of just 38.3% and the structural weaknesses of the body corporate ?s committee 
system results in a score of just 50.7.  In Scotland too, the lowest score is assigned to the sole period 
of single party majority government in 2011 (although at 56.3, this still contrasts favourably with 
Westminster and  W to a lesser extent  W the NAW).  In this respect, whilst the electoral rules of the 
devolved assemblies have not always led to the  ‘ďƌŽĂĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ŽĨƚĞŶĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ 
with consensus democracies (Lijphart, 2012: 2), the prevalence of minority governments has 
enhanced the conditions for  ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐǇ-ŵĂŬŝŶŐĚŝĨĨƵƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĂǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ? ?Siaroff, 
2003: 445).  
 
 
 Correspondence with democratic norms  
 
Powell does not offer a benchmark to assess the quality of effective representation, although he does 
suggest that scores for total conditions for effective representation  ‘ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚŝŐŚ  ? ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ůŽǁ  ? ?Ɛ ?
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵů ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ƐĐŽƌĞƐ ĂƌŽƵŶĚthe 
 ‘ŵŝĚƉŽŝŶƚ ?ďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ? ?WŽǁĞůů, 2000: 111).  With average scores ranging from 56.4 to 62.1, it is 
evident whilst the institutional conditions in each polity have connected a majority of voters with the 
policy process, a significant minority remains excluded.  Indeed, in all three polities the plurality 
ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?average government share (i.e. office payoff) and policymaker share (i.e. policy payoff) has 
significantly exceed their share of the popular vote, whereas all runners-up have been consistently 
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under-rewarded on both counts.  The extent to which this is a cause for concern depends on the 
criteria adopted, that is, whether a polity is being judged against the standards of majoritarianism or 
proportionality.  As detailed above, majoritarianism assumes that the plurality winner should enjoy 
full control of government and policymaking, whereas proportionality demands a close correlation 
between popular support and the dispersal of electoral payoffs (Powell, 2000: 137).  Accordingly, 
figures 3a and 3b below compare the dispersal of government shares and policymaker shares against 
the standards of majoritarianism and proportionality.4 In terms of government shares, figure 3a shows 
that the election outcomes in all polities correspond most closely to the majoritarian norm; and of the 
fifteen individual elections observed, the initial outcomes of eleven (including NAW 1999 and NAW 
2007) correspond exactly.  Whilst this suggests the limitations of  ‘ŶĞǁƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂŶĚtĂůĞƐ
in terms of the sharing of executive power, it should be noted that instances of coalition have lessened 
the distance from the norm of proportionality; and for two periods of coalition (SP 2003 and NAW 
2007), there is a closer correspondence with this norm than with majoritarianism.  
 
***Figure 3a here*** 
 
 
In terms of policymaker shares, figure 3b, a slightly different story emerges.  On average, the dispersal 
of policymaker shares in Scotland and Wales corresponds more closely to the proportional influence 
norm; and in only two individual instances has this dispersal been in closer accordance with the 
majoritarian norm.  It is important not to overstate the significance of these results, as in each region 
the extent to which the dispersal of policymaker shares display a closer correspondence to the 
proportional norm than to the majoritarian norm are relatively small (6.2 and 6.5 in Scotland and 
Wales respectively).  Moreover, whilst the dispersal of policymaker shares within the Scottish 
Parliament and NAW corresponds more closely to proportional norm than the dispersal of 
policymaker shares at Westminster, the differences are again relatively small (5.0 and 4.8 
respectively).  Notwithstanding these caveats, though, the case remains that once opportunities for 
policy payoffs are taken into account, the institutional structures of the Scottish Parliament and NAW 
have functioned in closer accordance with the proportional norm; whereas the structures of 
Westminster have displayed a closer congruence with the majoritarian norm in terms of both office 
and policy payoffs.  
 
***Figure 3b here*** 
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Taken together, these results show the systems of regional governments in Scotland and Wales have 
departed from the norms of majoritarianism, ĂůďĞŝƚƚŽŵŽƌĞŵŽĚĞƐƚĚĞŐƌĞĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƌŚĞƚŽƌŝĐŽĨ ‘ŶĞǁ
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ǁŽƵůĚ ŝŵƉůǇ ? This relatively small shift not only underlines the extent to which the 
architecture of devolution has been constrained by a centrally-designed framework derived from 
Westminster practice, but also is suggestive of the way in which the culture of majoritarianism has 
continued to imbue governing practice, particularly with regards to pattern of government formation 
(an issue further discussed in the conclusion).  Nonetheless, the introduction of a more proportional 
electoral system for the Scottish Parliament and NAW has had a clear effect in terms of closing the 
gap between votes cast and seats won; and despite limitations to the structures of opposition 
influence (notably the committee system), the increased vote basis of the legislature has ensured that 
ĂŵŽƌĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐĂƌĞ ‘ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? in the policy process.  Indeed, by simulating the 
outcomes oĨƚŚĞĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽƚŚĞ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂŶĚEtƵŶĚĞƌtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƌƵůĞƐ
(and vice-versa), the seemingly modest changes wrought by two regional systems of government are 
made plain (see table 5, online).5  Under tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƌƵůĞƐ ? the average vote basis of the 
Scottish and Welsh legislatures would be diminished, whilst the share of the seats accorded to the 
plurality winning party would be further exaggerated; and the gap between the effective number of 
parliamentary and electoral parties would widen, loosening the relationship between votes cast and 
seats won.  Conversely, if conducted under the electoral rules of either the Scottish Parliament or the 
NAW, voters in Westminster elections would enjoy a much closer connection with policymaking, as 
evidenced by the increased vote basis of the legislature and closer correspondence between votes 
cast and seats won.   
 
 
Concluding comments and future research 
 
Despite the normative claims of its proponents, there is no a priori reason to assume that 
decentralisation forges a closer connection between voters and legislators.  In recognition, this article 
has examined the institutional inputs (i.e. electoral rules and legislative committee systems) that 
structure these connections, focusing on the national and regional systems of UK government.  It has 
revealed a broadly similar pattern of electoral payoffs across the three polities, whereby the 
majoritarian allocation of the spoils of office has been partially offset by institutional opportunities for 
opposition parties to secure policy payoffs; and that the aggregation of institutional inputs in each 
polity has provided the conditions to connect a majority of voters with the policy process.  In doing 
so, it has demonstrated that dichotomous contrasts between the elite, adversarial majoritarianism of 
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Westminster and the more inclusive, consensual exercise of power within the devolved parliaments 
are exaggerated.  At the same time, it has isolated the effects of specific institutional structures on 
the dispersal of payoffs, which underlines the potential of a multi-dimensional reform agenda for 
improving proportionality (i.e. electoral reform) and enhancing the conditions for opposition influence 
(i.e.  legislative committee reform).  These findings are timely.  The Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 
2017 have transferred important powers relating to electoral rules, constituency boundaries and 
legislative structures.  The devolved governments now have their disposal key constitutional levers, 
which if used effectively could ĚĞůŝǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĞůƵƐŝǀĞ  ‘ƐǁĞĞƚ ƐƉŽƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶrepresentation and 
accountability (Carey and Hix, 2011). However, whether such a constitutional entrepreneur will 
emerge remains an open question.  The SNP, for example has faced repeated charges of sidelining 
,ŽůǇƌŽŽĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝĂŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ Ăůů ƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ĂĐĐƵƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ Đ^ŽƚƚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ‘ƚƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
Parliament with cŽŶƚĞŵƉƚ ? ?ƐĞĞĂǀŝĚƐŽŶ, 2008).  Moreover, evidence from Wales suggests that the 
capacity of non-government AMs to effectively fulfil their legislative responsibilities has been 
hampered by the comparatively small size of the plenary, with Welsh democracy being described as 
 ‘ƵŶĚĞƌ-powered, over-ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚƌĂŝŶ ? ?ůĞĐƚŽƌĂůZĞĨŽƌŵ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇǇŵƌƵ, 2013: 32). As this 
suggests, whilst institutional reform can support a more consensual approach to policymaking, a 
genuine shift in political culture demands commitment and will, both of which appear to be in short 
supply.   
 
 
This empirical examination has been facilitated by an analytical framework that enables the 
representative capacity of central and regional systems of government to be compared on an 
equivalent basis, and in this respect the article makes an important methodological contribution to 
the wider pool of comparative scholarship.  Comparative studies of regional government are scarce, 
and no studies exist which systematically compare different levels of government within the same 
polity.  dŚŝƐ ůĂĐƵŶĂ ŝƐ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ĂƐ ĂŶ  ‘ĞƌĂ ŽĨ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŚĂƐ  ‘ŽƉĞŶĞĚ ƵƉ Ă ŶĞǁ ĨŝĞůĚ ĨŽƌ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞĞŶƋƵŝƌǇ PƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?,ŽŽŐŚĞĞƚĂů, 2010: 61-2). By refining the tools of cross-
national institutional analysis, this article has developed an analytical framework that can be applied 
ƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŝĞƌƐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ ?ƚŚƵƐĂůůŽǁŝŶŐĨŽƌĂ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐďĞƚƚĞƌĂƚƚƵŶĞĚ
to the multi-scale ƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůŝĨĞ ? ?:ĞĨĨĞry and Wincott, 2010: 170, emphasis in 
original).  The scope therefore exists for future scholarship to extend the research presented in this 
article by applying it to a wider range of cases, which would provide valuable comparative information 
and would facilitate intra- and inter-polity benchmarking. TŚĞ ƌĞĨŝŶĞŵĞŶƚƐ ƚŽ WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů
framework have also allowed for a political analysis better attuned to the multi-dimensionality of the 
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institutional dynamics of opposition politics (see Kaiser, 2008).  As Strøm and Mattson argue, 
 ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞĂƐƐƵŵed to affect 
the distribution of legislative power and ultiŵĂƚĞůǇƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P256).  This approach therefore 
ŚĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůďĞŶĞĨŝƚƐ PǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ‘Žutput indices can only be observed; input indices [can be] 
subject to purposeful institutionaů ĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?  ?dĂĂŐĞƉĞƌĂ, 2003: p. 2).  In the pervading climate of 
democratic dissatisfaction (Norris, 2011), the potential for institutional engineering to improve the 
representativeness and inclusivity of policymaking is therefore an attractive strategy, albeit one that 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐ ‘ƐƵƉƌĞŵĞĂůƚƌƵŝƐŵ ?(Judge, 1993) on the part of those holding the levers of reform.   
 
 
Yet, in terms of the extent to which regional government fosters a closer connection between voters 
and legislators ?ĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ‘ƐŽǁŚĂƚ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ P ‘ĚŽĞƐƚŚĞƚǇƉĞŽĨ ?regional democracy make 
a ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĨŽƌƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ?  ?sĂƚƚĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚĂĚĞůŵĂŶŶ-Steffen, 2013: 88).  Whilst this article has 
ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ǁŚĂƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƚĞƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉŽůŝƚǇ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? (i.e. the input legitimacy of a system of 
government) ?ĨƵƚƵƌĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐŚŽƵůĚĂůƐŽƐĞĞŬƚŽŝůůƵŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƚƉƵƚ
legitimacy of policy decisions taken).  This important research agenda is beginning to receive attention 
(for example Cairney et al., 2016), but further research is required to systematically explore whether 
policy outputs are more reflective of popular preferences at the national or regional level.  To develop 
this agenda fully, future research will need to isolate the policy preferences of a given ƉŽůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ 
electorate by focusing the alignment between parties and voters, and the extent to which regional 
systems of government encourage greater responsiveness in terms of the median voter and the 
diversity of party competition.  In turn, future research should also seek to capture the extent to which 
ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ŵƵůƚŝ-level, and whether there is variance in voting behaviour in 
elections to central and regional government.  This would dovetail with extant scholarship that has 
identified the co-existence of multiple systems of party competition across the UK (for example, Lynch, 
2007; Quinn, 2012), and would yield important insights regarding the that regional government 
provides opportunities for voters to express a different policy preferences.   However, whilst there are 
several data sources pertaining to national-level politics  W such as Eurobarometer, the Comparative 
Study of Electoral Systems, and the Comparative Manifesto Project  W there remains a dearth of 
comparable information for other tiers of government.  Whilst nascent steps in this direction have 
been taken (see, for example, Bäck et al., 2013; Pogorelis et al., 2005), the emphasis has been upon 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐand policy outputs, rather than the alignment 
between party platforms and the policy preferences of the electorate.  In order to address this, the 
accrual of data relating to the policy preferences of voters in regional elections is vital.  As Jeffery and 
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Wincott have made clear, a meaningful turn away from methodological nationalism demands the 
ĂĐƋƵŝƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ? ĂŶĚ ŶĞǁ ? ĚĂƚĂ ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? The 
transformative potential of this ambitious research agenda justifies the investment of scholarly time 
and resource. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 dŚĞ ‘ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚďǇ,ŽŽŐŚĞĞƚĂů  ? ? ? ? ? ?ƌĞǀĞĂůƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌƐĞůĨ-rule in 
Scotland and Wales increased at one fell swoop from a mere 1/15 in each domain to 13/15 and 8/15 respectively.   
2 Table 3, available online, details in full the underlying calculations for the total conditions for effective 
representation.   
3 dŚĞ ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ >ĂďŽƵƌ ?Ɛ ZŽƐĞŵĂƌǇ ƵƚůĞƌ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ƐƐĞŵďůǇ ?Ɛ WƌĞƐŝĚŝŶŐ KĨĨŝĐĞƌ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞĚƵĐĞĚ>ĂďŽƵƌ ?ƐƐĞĂƚƐĨƌŽŵ ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? 
4 Table 4, available online, details in full dataset for the overall electoral responsiveness according to 
majoritarian and proportional norms, 1997-2017.   
5 The simulation is achieved by calculating the ratio between the average percentage of votes and the average 
percentage of seats for the plurality winner, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th+ parties under one set of electoral rules, and 
applying this to the outcomes of the elections in another domain.  It does not simulate the vote basis of 
government, as this is a matter of political negotiation rather than an automatic product of electoral rules. 
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Figure 1: Scoring scheme for the index of effective representation  
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Figure 2: Total conditions for effective representation, 1999-2007 
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Figure 3a: Overall electoral performance in terms of government shares, 1999-2007 
 
 
 
Note: where there is no bar, the value is 0 (zero). 
 
 
Figure 3b: Overall electoral performance in terms of policymaker shares, 1999-2007 
 
 
 
 
